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1. Ozer SELCUK (CentER, Department of Econometrics & Operations Re-
search, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands)
Average covering tree solution for directed graph games
For a cooperative game with limited communication structure, only connected sets of
players are able to cooperate. This situation is often represented by an undirected graph
on the set of players, in which an (undirected) edge between two players means that
both can communicate with each other. Instead of an undirected graph in which the
communication is bilateral between players, we consider communication structures that
are represented by a directed graph in which players could possibly communicate in
only one direction. When players are able to communicate in both directions with each
other, the two directed edges between them could be considered as an undirected edge.
For the class of cooperative games with directed graphs as communication structure we
introduce as solution concept the average covering tree solution. For games with complete
communication this solution is the Shapley value and for games with undirected graphs
it is the gravity center of the convex hull of marginal vectors, recently introduced by
Koshevoy and Talman. We also give convexity-type of conditions under which the solution
is an element of the core and therefore cannot be blocked by any coalition. In case the
directed graph is a hierarchy the condition is weaker than super-additivity.
(joint work with D. Talman and A. Khmelnitska¨ıa)
Contact: ozeeer@gmail.com .
2. Miklo´s PINTE´R (Department of Mathematics, Corvinus University of Bu-
dapest, 1093 Hungary, Budapest, Fo˝va´m te´r 13-15)
Axioms and interpretations
We consider transferable utility (TU) games, solutions of these games and axioms for,
and axiomatizations of certain specific solu- tions. We focus on the “meanings” of var-
ious axioms. By “meanings” we mean interpretations, so we consider applications too.
We discuss the core compatibility, the equal treatment property (symmetry), the Pareto
optimality (efficiency) and various monotonicity axioms. Some steps are taken in the
direction of exploring what types of solutions the combinations of axioms determine, and
how these (the determinations) change when we vary the domain (sub-classes) of the con-
sidered solutions. Most importantly, we interpret monotonicity as incentive compatibility,
and illustrate our argument by examples.
Contact: miklos.pinter@uni-corvinus.hu.
3. Michel MINOUX (Universite´ de Paris VI, LIP6)
On minimizing convex Choquet integrals on polyhedra and some LP- based formulations
We address here the problem of minimizing convex Choquet Integrals (also known as
‘Lovasz Extensions’ ) over polyhedra (extension to mixed integer solution sets is also
discussed). Typical applications of such problems concern the search of compromise
solutions in multicriteria optimization. We focus here on the case when the Choquet
Integrals to be minimized are convex, implying that the set functions (or ‘capacities’
) underlying the Choquet Integrals considered are submodular. We first describe an
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approach based on a large scale Linear Programming (LP) formulation, and show how
it can be handled via the so-called column-generation technique. We next investigate
alternatives based on compact LP formulations, i.e. formulations featuring a polynomial
number of variables and constraints. Results of computational experiments obtained on
transportation problems and knapsack problems are provided to illustrate the practical
efficiency of the proposed LP formulations.
(joint work with J. Lesca and P. Perny, Universite´ de Paris VI, LIP6)
Contact: minouxm@poleia.lip6.fr.
4. Vincent IEHLE´ (Universite´ Paris-Dauphine)
Convexity and core in partition function games
We discuss the convexity assumption in partition function form games and its relation-
ship with the core concepts. In the standard framework of characteristic function games,
convexity a` la Shapley plays a key role in the analysis of stability. Convexity arises
if the game displays increasing returns to scale in cooperation and is equivalent to su-
permodularity in the lattice of coalitions. Defining its counterpart in partition function
games requires to account for the expectations of players with respect to the new coali-
tion structure as groups merge. We introduce a definition of convexity precisely based
on externality schemes, which can be related to the existing concepts of core in partition
function games. We also discuss its relationship with supermodularity in the lattice of
embedded coalitions.
(joint work with Giovanna Bimonte (U. Salerno, Italia))
Contact: viehle@gmail.com.
5. Jean-Luc MARICHAL (University of Luxembourg, Mathematics Research
Unit, 6, rue Coudenhove-Kalergi, L-1359 Luxembourg-Kirchberg)
Influence and interaction indexes in cooperative games: a unified least squares approach
The classical Banzhaf power and interaction indexes used in cooperative game theory
appear naturally as leading coefficients in the standard least squares approximation of
the game under consideration by a set function of a specified degree. We observe that
this still holds true if we consider approximations by set functions depending on specified
variables. We show that the Banzhaf influence index can also be obtained from this new
approximation problem. Considering certain weighted versions of this approximation,
we also introduce a class of weighted Banzhaf influence indexes and analyze their most
important properties.
(joint work with Pierre Mathonet)
Contact: jean-luc.marichal@uni.lu.
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6. Kim Thang NGUYEN (Laboratory IBISC, Universite´ E´vry Val d’Essonne,
France)
Congestion Games with Capacitated Resources
The players of a congestion game interact by allocating bundles of resources from a
common pool. This type of games leads to well studied models for analyzing strategic
situations, including networks operated by uncoordinated selfish users. Congestion games
constitute a subclass of potential games, meaning that a pure Nash equilibrium emerges
from a myopic process where the players iteratively react by switching to a strategy
that diminishes their individual cost. With the aim of covering more applications, for
instance in communication networks, we extend congestion games to the setting where
every resource is endowed with a capacity which possibly limits its number of users and
an order of preference over players. Though a pure Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed
to exist in any case, we mainly prove that congestion games with capacities are potential
games in the natural and well studied case where bundles of resources are singletons.
Besides, we also investigate in efficient algorithms to compute a Nash equilibrium in case
of existence.
(joint work with Laurent Gourve`s, Je´roˆme Monnot and Stefano Moretti)
Contact: thang@ibisc.fr.
7. Ste´phane GONZALEZ (Universite´ de Paris I, 106-112 Bd de l’Hoˆpital 75013
Paris)
Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games
A central problem in cooperative game is to define a sharing of the total worth of a game.
The core is one of the most popular concept of solution because it ensures that no rational
subcoalition has interest to leave the grand coalition. However, the core is often empty
and other concepts of solution had to be elaborated. The k-additive core, proposed by
Grabisch and Miranda, is a new concept which will prove to be an interesting tool to
keep the general spirit of coalitional rationality, and which has also the advantage to be
nonempty as soon as k ≥ 2. A solution of the k-additive core gives a payment to each
player and to each coalitions up to size k. Therefore, if each player accepts to pool a
part of his gain with the other players, it is possible to preserve coalitional rationality.
We introduce some natural solutions of the k-additive core which minimizes the amount
of pooling or, equivalently, which maximizes the individual value. In a second part, we
study the set of preimputations which can be obtained with this new point of view and
we compare them with some classical alternatives to the core.
(joint work with Michel Grabisch)
Contact: g1stephane@gmail.com.
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